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Although Adam Smith’s 1776 Wealth of Nations is often cited as marking the birth of economics, it was really 
not until after the second world war that economics became the distinctive, more or less unified, and largely 
separate discipline summarised in the textbooks of today. Even a mere fifty years ago, it was possible for the 
intelligent reader to move with relative ease between economics on the one hand and political economy, 
sociology and social theory, psychology and philosophy on the other. This is now no longer the case, and most 
young economists are taught to think of their discipline, not primarily in terms of the particular ‘economic’ social 
phenomena it was once taken to be about, but as a sophisticated and largely self-contained analytical approach 
to the investigation of social phenomena of any kind. 
Even so, economics has never been able to separate itself entirely from its sister disciplines, even at the high 
tide of mathematical economics and positivism during the 1970s and 1980s, and many of the most active new 
areas in economics currently involve some form of boundary crossing (e.g. experimental economics, 
neuroeconomics and computational economics to name just three). With respect to the philosophy of 
economics in particular, the last fifty years or so have seen a steady expansion in scholarly investigation into 
different connections between economics and philosophy, with the emergence of new journals, professional 
associations, research networks and the like. There has been a great deal of work on epistemological questions 
in the wake of the decline of positivism, on boundary issues and the question of whether or not economics 
constitutes a science, and on the rhetoric of economics, ethics, value and, latterly, the ontology of economics 
(Hands, 2001). 
It is against this background that, in 2004, three of us published the Elgar Companion to Economics and 
Philosophy (Davis, Marciano and Runde, 2004, henceforth the Companion), an edited collection aimed at 
documenting the current state of play in three important areas of the philosophy of economics: 
1. Political economy as political philosophy; 
2. The methodology and epistemology of economics; and 
3. Social ontology and the ontology of economics. 
The various authors represented in the volume were chosen on the basis of their having made distinctive 
contributions in these general areas, and they were asked, not only to survey the state of the field as they saw it, 
but also provide statements of their own positions and their perspectives on the field in question and its 
possible direction of development in the future. Imposed upon them, therefore, was the need both to mine the 
philosophical subject matter of economics and also to stand back from it to assess it in a manner that would do 
justice to the complex interrelations that exist between these different points of access as they saw them at the 
time. In effect, then, the authors were asked to anticipate the volume’s appearance and its reviews, and were 
thus the first voice in the dialogue recorded below. 
The Companion was subsequently the subject of a session at the meeting of the History of Economics Society, 
held at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington between 24–27 June 2005, and the present 
‘review’ comprises revised versions of the contributions to that session. The structure of the session followed 
the structure of the book, with separate commentaries on each of the three sections listed above, from people 
from a range of different perspectives: Peter Boettke and Chris Coyne (PB&CC, representatives of the Austrian 
School of economics), Margaret Schabas (MS, a philosopher and historian of economic ideas) and Francesco 
Guala (FG, a philosopher of science). The commentators were asked to concentrate on general issues that 
emerged in the papers comprising the section of the book they had responsibility for. Each of the commentaries 
was then followed by a brief reply from the editor who had principal responsibility for that section in the book, 
and these responses are also reproduced below. 
1. Political Economy as Political Philosophy 
1.1. Comment: Modern Political Economy (PB&CC) 
Political Economy has made a comeback. At the turn of twentieth century, the term political economy began to 
be purged from the scientific discipline of economics. This started to change with the economic analysis of 
politics in the 1950s and 1960s, when the tools of economic analysis began to be employed to analyse voting 
behaviour, bureaucracy, public policy decision making and constitutional choice. The new field of public choice 
political economy was born and in 1986 James M. Buchanan was awarded the Nobel Prize for his contribution in 
founding this line of research. 
Although rational choice politics has become a major research field in both economics and political science, 
there was always something a bit odd about the research programme. It was born out of a frustration with an 
institutionally antiseptic theory of the market economy, politics and public policy. But when pursued to its 
extreme, it would once again result in an alternative version of an institutionally antiseptic state of 
affairs.1 Political economy pursued via rational choice modelling would become what it had hoped to escape: a 
theory in which the behavioural assumptions of the model do the heavy intellectual lifting. Only when the 
programme of rational choice was pursued in a watered-down manner by weakening the strict demands on 
rationality associated with the mainstream, did political, legal, social and economic institutions again begin to 
matter in determining performance.2 Rational choice as if humans were automatons suggests a view of the 
world as populated by programmable robots but a rational choice approach that emphasises the human 
element could be used to analyse a world populated by actors with all their imperfections. Such a world is less 
predictable than the automaton world but it is also one that can say something about beliefs, ideologies and 
norms.3 
In this light, Part I of the Companion makes an important contribution to modern political economy by exploring 
the evolution of the behavioural assumptions employed within the discipline of economics. The authors adopt a 
looser notion of rationality than the conventional one, emphasising agent purposefulness and institutional 
contingency. Specifically, the emphasis on the interplay of cognition, economy and society in the essays by 
Marciano (Chapter 2), Heap (Chapter 3) and Frey and Benz (Chapter 4) highlight the importance of moving 
beyond the standard model of the perfect maximising agent. We seek to trace the implications of these essays 
for modern political economy. 
It is our contention that the social science landscape can be depicted as follows: 
  
 CLEAN EMPIRICAL WORK DIRTY EMPIRICAL WORK 
THIN THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION Economic theory and 
econometrics 
Analytic Narrative Political 
Economy 
THICK THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION Sociological and Political science 
econometrics 
Anthropology, Cultural Sociology, 
and Institutional Political Science 
 
(1) 
[Methodological Predispositions and the Social Science Landscape] 
In our view, the domain that modern political economy is best suited to occupy is the upper right quadrant. 
Economists have traditionally approached their subject matter by providing a parsimonious theory and then 
confronting that theory with as clean an empirical test as possible. The problem with this approach is that by 
stressing the universal in all human behaviour the specific is lost, whereas in asserting that all behaviour is 
specific as in traditional anthropology, the ability to communicate and understand across history and culture is 
lost. Thus thin/clean and thick/dirty will often fall short of providing fully satisfactory explanations of the world. 
But we contend that somewhere between the economist’s penchant for the general (the thin and clean) and the 
anthropologist’s demand for respect for the specific, there lies an approach which maintains the analytical 
structure of the economic way of thinking but respects the unique institutional arrangements that structure the 
rules of the game and their enforcement in any particular historical setting. We believe that this is the 
intellectual space where progress in modern political economy will be made in the coming decade.4 
Ludwig von Mises analysed the implications of the dual assumptions of government agent omniscience and 
benevolence, and discovered that such assumptions led to the conclusion that the State was in a better position 
to succeed as compared to erring individuals (1966, p. 692). Mises’s point was that these assumptions had the 
affect of assuming what it is that the theorists of government planning had to prove, i.e., that the State was in 
fact in a position to assess the economic value of alternative productive activities rationally. In contrast, von 
Mises argued that the institution of state ownership and centralised economic planning would in fact run 
counter to making such assessments in an economically rational manner. James Buchanan (1969, pp. 77–
92) followed this insight up by emphasising that the opportunity costs that entrepreneurs face within a market 
context are entirely different from the opportunity costs faced by those within a bureaucratic context. Both von 
Mises and Buchanan therefore called on people to question the behavioural assumptions of omniscience and 
benevolence. A political economy in which the actor is neither simpleton nor shining genius, neither pure sinner 
nor pure saint, would instead have to come to grips with how alternative institutional configurations impact on 
economic arrangements and performance. 
As long as political economists are wedded to the behavioural assumptions of neoclassical economics, the 
persistent and consistent application of that model will result in analyses that neglect the very institutional 
arrangements that were to be studied by political economy.5 Only by moving away from model of the economic 
actor as a perfect maximiser towards one that adopts a more humble view of man’s cognitive capacity, will the 
questions of how cooperation and coordination emerge in social intercourse ever be adequately addressed. The 
tendency has been to divide the discipline of economics into theory and empirics (whether historical or 
statistical). We contend that what we have learned in the evolution of modern political economy is that 
however important pure theory may be, the most pressing questions are to be found in the institutionally 
contingent theory that constitutes political economy. The shift forces the social scientist to move from a model 
in which the behavioural assumptions do most of the work to one in which most of the work is done by 
recognising the institutional specifications within which actors interact. 
This theory is broadly conceived to include not just public choice, but also law and economics, economic 
sociology, new institutionalism, etc. (see the essay by Hodgson, Chapter 5). It is the evolution of institutions 
(including tinkering at the margins) and how these institutions provide the necessary filters in social intercourse 
that lead to either the promotion of social cooperation or inducement of social conflict that determines the 
state of affairs in any given society (see the essay by Vroman, Chapter 6). Institutions, not behavioural 
assumptions, explain how order emerges. 
The purging of political economy at the beginning of the twentieth century was driven by methodological 
transformation of the social sciences in the philosophical realm, the rise of socialism and fascism in Europe and 
the near collapse of the capitalist system in the Great Depression in the US and UK. Economics as a discipline 
was expected to provide answers to these social questions and economics as social engineering was born. The 
long history of economics as social engineering did not end with the fracturing of the Keynesian consensus in the 
1970s or the collapse of communism in the 1980s. The task of economics as social engineering shifted, but the 
basic idea of economists at the levers of public policy to right what is wrong was maintained. 
The difficulties of post-communist transition and fostering development in the third world started to raise 
doubts in the ability of economics to provide appropriate guidance on the (re-)construction of economic 
systems. In order to be relevant, the discipline had to be broader in orientation and take into account political, 
legal, historical, social and even religious factors. In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century 
political economy was reborn. As Marciano’s essay (Chapter 2) highlights, we have come full circle to the ideas 
of Smith and Hume, a more humble political economy, but perhaps a wiser one. 
The issue of distributive justice (see the Fleurbaey essay, Chapter 7) perhaps best highlights the relationship 
between positive economic analysis and normative political economy. Economics proper cannot answer the 
question of whether profits are deserved or not. However, it can inform regarding the consequences of the 
answer that others provide to this question. Hayek (1976) argued that questions of distribution were often 
misplaced in political economy because they assumed a fixed pie that was being divided up according to rules of 
distribution that were judged as fair or not. Hayek’s objection was not that fair divisions are not desirable. His 
criticism was that the rules of fair division are not neutral with regard to the incentives and information 
associated with production. The size of the pie being divided depends on how we divide the pie. As Buchanan 
emphasised in his work, public policy cannot be thought of as one of distribution, but is instead always a 
question of the choice over rules of the game that engender a pattern of exchange and distribution. 
We have argued elsewhere that Buchanan is largely responsible for the rebirth of political economy as a 
scholarly agenda (Boettke, 1998). Buchanan’s work in public choice is often interpreted as the quintessential 
case of economic imperialism. However as Sen (1999, p.263) has pointed out, Buchanan should not be identified 
with economic imperialism. In fact, Sen states that Buchanan ‘has done more than most to introduce ethics, 
legal political thinking, and indeed social thinking into economics’ (quoted in Swedberg, 1990, p. 263). Crucial to 
understanding Buchanan’s system of thought is the distinction he made between politics and policy. 
Politics is about the rules of the game, where policy is focused on strategies that players adopt within a given set 
of rules. Questions about what are ‘good’ rules of the game are in the domain of social philosophy, whereas 
questions about the strategies that players will adopt given those rules is the domain of economics, and it is the 
play between the rules (social philosophy) and the strategies (economics) that constitutes what Buchanan refers 
to as constitutional political economy. No assessment of modern political economy as political philosophy can 
proceed without recognising the recurring theme in the work of Buchanan, Coase, Hayek, North and Vernon 
Smith on how the rules of the game and their enforcement dictate how the social game of life will be played. 
1.2. Reply (AM) 
In their rich and stimulating comment, Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne (PB&CC) observe that ‘political 
economy has made a comeback’. I take this to mean that, as is argued in the first section of the Companion, the 
distance that separates economics in its recent developments from its foundations in writings of the classical 
political economists has decreased over recent decades. That is to say, economics might once again be 
considered as a political or social philosophy that recognises that ‘the rules of the game and their enforcement 
dictate how the social game of life will be played’. 
It is interesting that (PB&CC) do not refer to the rather usual ‘new’ political economy but describe the revised 
version of political economy as ‘modern’ political economy – a term already used, for instance and amongst 
others, by Ruskin (1862) or Sidgwick (1885) and that can be traced throughout the twentieth century. ‘Modern’ 
political economy is supposed to reflect a genuine return to the roots of the discipline. How does it differ from 
the ‘new’ political economy? The answer is that, despite its claims about reviving the heritage of David Hume 
and Adam Smith, new political economy remains closer to neoclassical economics than to classical political 
economy. The reason for this, as noted by Wiseman (1991, p. 154), is that new political economists ‘are as yet 
reluctant simply to abandon the analytical aides furnished by neoclassical economists’. From this perspective, 
Buchanan’s writings provide a clear example of the tension that frequently characterises the writings of new 
political economists. Thus while he sometimes argues that one has to distinguish ‘between questions that can 
be analysed by treating the actor as equivalent to a rat (where neoclassical economics is most appropriate) and 
those that require the actor to be viewed as a creative individual (where the subjectivist economics of Shackle 
(1972) and the Austrians is more appropriate)’ (as quoted by PB&CC in Section 1.1), he nonetheless maintains 
that ‘there is a powerful argument that suggests the appropriateness of something akin to the homo 
œconomicus postulate for behaviour’ (Buchanan, 1990, p. 15); see also (Buchanan, 1987). What Boettke and 
Coyne describe as Buchanan’s difficult trick ‘of appearing both a hard-boiled rational choice theorist and a social 
philosopher and political economist’, clearly illustrates what Wiseman (1991) calls the ‘uneasy cohabitation’ 
between new political economy and the dominant paradigm. 
Undoubtedly, then, the difference between new and modern political economy is closely connected with their 
respective conceptions of economic man. Whereas proponents of new political economy remain committed to 
the expected utility maximiser of mainstream economics, proponents of modern political economy should refer 
to a model ‘that adopts a more humble view of man’s cognitive capacity’ (PB&CC, in Section 1.1) – a conception 
closer to that of Hume or Smith; see Marciano (2005). Thus, the idea that what makes ‘modern’ political 
economy distinctive is that it takes into consideration the rules in which ‘the social game of life’ is played is only 
partially true. The other characteristic of a genuine revival of the ‘spirit’ of classical political economists is that it 
makes room for human (radical) subjectivity and limited cognitive capacities, and acknowledges that individuals 
play ‘the social game of life’ as homo sapiens rather than merely homo œconomicus. 
This leads to a second set of remarks about PB&CC’s distinction between politics being ‘about the rules of the 
game’ and economics being about ‘strategies that players adopt within a given set of rules’ (emphasis added). 
My own view is that this perspective tends to equate ‘modern’ with ‘new’ political economy. In fact, the 
assumption that ‘economics’ consists in the analysis of strategic behaviour ‘within a given set of rules’ indeed 
characterises new political economy (public choice, law and economics and even constitutional economics). This 
is clearly reflected in the standard distinction between constitutional behaviour – the definition of rules – and 
post-constitutional behaviour – behaviour within given rules. It then comes as no surprise that the kind of 
models advanced by new political economists should be much the same as standard neoclassical models that 
describe optimising individuals as choosing their most preferred element from a set of given alternatives or from 
a set of alternatives delineated by given rules. To this extent new political economy simply follows standard 
neoclassical economics in assuming away the complexities of human subjectivity and cognitive limitations. 
The trouble is that these complexities cannot easily be ignored, that individuals use their personal experiences 
and limited capacities to understand the complex and ambiguous information that they receive from their 
environment, and that their behaviour thus rests on the way that they subjectively represent and 
imaginatively create their environment. Therefore, in contrast to what neoclassical and new political economists 
argue, individual behaviour is not so much about choosing within the set of alternatives defined by given rules, 
as it is about formulating (through subjective evaluation) alternatives and opportunities, thereby often altering 
the rules that frame them. In other words, playing the ‘social game of life’, individuals modify the rules that 
delineate the set within which they are assumed to behave. They do not (only) ‘react’ to constraints but (also) 
‘create’ them (on reactive and creative choices, see Buchanan (1989). This perspective thus certainly suggests 
that institutions should be designed in order to let individual behave creatively (Buchanan and Vanberg, 2002). 
In particular, one evidently important type of creative behaviour is that of entrepreneurs. It can be argued that 
‘genuine’ entrepreneurship is not so much about discovering possibilities that already (although implicitly) exist 
than it is about totally creating new and (for that reason) totally unpredictable alternatives (Witt, 2004). If so, 
attempts to modify the rules of the game should be envisaged as reflecting the positive creativity of free 
individuals rather than being described as mere opportunism. Accordingly, questions arise about the quality of 
the new rules that are created. This means that, from the perspective of economics as social philosophy, 
questions about what are ‘‘‘good’’ rules of the game’ and those ‘about the strategies that players will adopt 
given those rules’ do not belong to two different domains that should be analysed separately. Rather, they form 
the two branches of one discipline, namely modern political economy. To revive the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’– words of 
the utmost importance –‘of classical political economists’, as Buchanan himself notes, implies the development 
of analyses based upon a ‘vision’ of what a good society is or what institutional arrangements ought to be 
(Buchanan, 2000; 1990, pp. 16–8). 
Once again, these questions all result from a change in the behavioural assumptions used by economists. The 
‘spirit of classical political economy’ will revive only to the extent that they are taken into account. 
2. The Methodology and Epistemology of Economics 
2.1. Comment (MS) 
First, I commend the editors for compiling a very balanced overview of the subject of Economics and Philosophy. 
My job is somewhat harder than the other two reviewers, since there is already an Elgar Companion on the 
Methodology of Economics, and, as that volume makes manifest, there are many topics that have been 
excluded here. I was prompted to address the question of balance. I think the selection of topics is perfectly fine 
and representative, as samples go, but we all have our favourites. Of the ones that spring more readily to mind, 
and are not included here, are idealisation, laws and experimentation. An assessment of econometrics is notably 
absent. Reductionism as a general theme is analysed in some detail in Harold Kincaid’s essay, but the more 
specific problems of bridging micro- and macroeconomics are central and specific to the discipline and would 
have benefited from more direct attention. 
The section assigned to me also conjoins methodology to epistemology, and three of the entries (chapters 10–
12) aim toward that end more than the purely methodological. None of them, however, truly grapples with 
what is known, or what can be known, about economic phenomena, to the same extent as some of the entries 
in the section on Ontology grapple with fundamental questions of existence. If anything, it is the latter set that 
brush up against the epistemological. Nor should one expect these topics to be neatly cordoned off from one 
another but it is at least worth mentioning that there is more to be found on methodology and epistemology in 
Part III. I will cover the entries in the order given by the book and then make some general comments on the set 
as a whole. 
Roger Backhouse provides a solid and accurate account of the rise and fall of Lakatosian readings of economics 
but with the aim of salvaging the approach. He argues that it is incorrect to merge Lakatos with Kuhn or Popper, 
since Lakatos comes out of a very different set of traditions, namely that of philosophy of mathematics, 
Hungarian communism and, reaching further back, Hegelian-Marxism. While is it always the case that under the 
magnifying glass one can find unique attributes for anything, I think that compared and contrasted to other 
schools of interpretation, Lakatos is still rightfully grouped with Popper, and Kuhn for that matter. Popper’s 
interests in physics, his own Austrian-Marxist heritage and, as it happens, Kuhn’s position in Cold War America, 
suggest that future historians will lump them together with impunity. The questions they raised and attempted 
to answer, particularly the one of combative research schools, are here to stay. The one qualification to note is 
that the lesser attention paid to the sociological dimensions by Popper and Lakatos (nature could shout back 
unequivocally for them) means that Kuhn’s stock is rising, and to some extent this is reflected in the fact that all 
but one of the entries in Part II refer to his seminal book. 
Wade Hands makes the solid point that the constructivist position of the Strong Program, namely that science is 
partly or wholly the product of social conditions, is to a large extent unexciting when applied to economics. We 
expect, after all, that economists are reflecting on the economic and social conditions of their time. Ricardian 
economics is partly about the recently industrialised British economy, just as Keynesian economics reflects the 
downturn of the 1920s and early 1930s. Moreover, as Hands acknowledges, much of the SSK (sociology of 
scientific knowledge) literature directs the sociological toward the economic. Whether neoclassical, 
institutionalist or Marxist, ‘some version of (disciplinary) economics informs (implicitly or explicitly) much of the 
work of those writing in SSK’ and is thus more accurately ESK, the ‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (p. 205). 
There are still many underdeveloped veins to tap however. Hands mentions in passing the difficulty of 
delineating ‘the economy’, and even more problematically, of what constitutes the scientific understanding of it. 
The difficulties are compounded once one is reminded that there are important physical and biological 
dimensions to economic phenomena, whether it be the role of time or the rate of population growth. The path-
breaking work of SSK seems to have broken down certain conceptual barriers but, as Hands notes at the end of 
his fine account, there is much work to be done in sorting out the myriad number and circularity of factors that 
shape our knowledge of ‘the economy’. Certainly any simple linear model has to be set aside. 
Drucilla Barker makes a compelling case for the significance of feminist economics, and points to a burgeoning 
literature that addresses income discrepancies, unpaid household labour and the significance of the marketplace 
in reproduction (e.g. surrogate mothers). She also leaves the reader with the impression that things are still at a 
very preliminary stage in this particular subdiscipline. This is partly because engaging in feminist economists 
appears to require an ability to transcend the privileged state of a trained (and hopefully employed) economist. 
Barker points to the need to move away from liberal feminism that tends to pass over all too quickly the greater 
oppressions of race, class and nation. ‘Feminist economists need to theorise a multiplicity of oppressions and 
examine the ways that subjectivities are produced and shaped by various, often contradictory, discourses, 
institutions, and the power relations inherent within them’ (p. 228). I am far from persuaded by this claim. 
Mainstream economists do not seem at all bothered to apologise if and when they direct their attention to poor 
regions of the world, or the unemployed. If feminist economists are to have an impact on the mainstream 
accounts, then they can be equally culpable of belonging to the privileged. True, to do feminist economics 
means to question the very categories by which we organise our world, divide it into rich and poor, male and 
female for example. In this sense, the poststructuralist movement she describes that queries the very language 
used in the discourse and repudiates any pretence at objectivity, seems of value. At the very least, it seems, 
gender as a useful category is here to stay. 
Because I know far less about postmodernism and the role of rhetoric, I will have to pass on commenting on 
Robert Garnett’s detailed entry, but would like to add that I commend the editors for its inclusion. Deirdre 
McCloskey appears to be the main figure since the early 1980s, and the fact that she has also embraced a 
feminist stance, suggests a convergence there as well. 
Marcel Boumans delves into interesting parallels between the use of models in physics and in economics. He 
endorses the position recently advanced by Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison (1999), namely that models 
are like material objects (the analogy is still somewhat murky), and in that sense can be used as tools and 
modified as such. Understanding a particular phenomenon in science has come to mean building a model. This, 
Boumans suggests, was as true in the work of Galileo or Kelvin, as it is in Irving Fisher or Jan Tinbergen. What we 
have in this essay is a very expansive reading of the term model, such that they proliferate throughout the 
history of science. I myself would welcome a more fine-grained taxonomy, one that separates and distinguishes 
the models, say of Samuelson or Akerlof, from game theory, or the work of David Ricardo. The ascription of 
models is ubiquitous in contemporary economics. If philosophers can help in rethinking basic assumptions, it 
would make sense to take issue with these ascriptions and develop more discriminating terms. But there is also 
merit in seeing the robustness of this conceptual tool as a central element to economic discourse and one can 
only welcome the recent contributions. 
The piece on formalism co-authored by Peter Kesting and Arnis Vilks argues that formalism is a much broader 
category than mathematics, and could be nothing more than the use of a proof or logical derivation with or 
without symbols. They suggest, therefore, that formalism reaches far back in time, from Cantillon and Quesnay 
through to Ricardo and von Thunen. The crowning achievement, however, is Gerard Debreu’s work of 1959. 
Where I think they go astray is in suggesting that formalism is synonymous with models. Again, models are a 
subset, but by no means exhaust the content of economic theory. I would submit that there are very few explicit 
or implicit models in economics before the twentieth century. In short, it is one thing to lay down postulates or 
propositions, and another to develop a model, and this is in consonance even with Boumans’ more capacious 
construal of the term. I think much can be gained if the word model was not so diluted but, rather, given a more 
specific range of meanings. 
Harold Kincaid’s entry on methodological individualism is very thorough and probing. He helps us to see the 
many different meanings employed in the commitment to methodological individualism as well as that there is 
no simple dichotomy between society and individuals. The advent of game theory, he points out, brings further 
complexity to the topic insofar as it posits multiple equilibria, and subpersonal strategies that appeal to ideal not 
real individuals. One conclusion he argues well is that the prospect of a successful or useful reduction to an 
individualist ontology is an empirical matter, and at this point there are only promissory notes. One of the only 
key issues here that Kincaid does not consider is the topic of personal identity that might make the individual a 
robust category in the first place. Because this entry spills into ontological issues, it provides a good segue into 
the next section of the Companion. 
Now for some general comments. The methodology of economics is a burgeoning field, perhaps not the most 
exciting, but still one worth the effort. These pieces help us to see the need to do much more work, to unpack 
the extension of the term model, to reflect more deeply about how mathematics is or is not coextensive with 
formalism, and to compile case studies on the success of reductionist explanations from groups to individuals in 
economics. The epistemology of economics is at an even more preliminary stage, insofar as the generation that 
cut its teeth on Lakatos is only now acknowledging its demise, or those imbued with SSK are only now grappling 
with the murky lines between the social, the economic, and the natural. Add a dash of feminism or 
postmodernism and one has quite a heady brew of topics and problems. 
In the very fine and thorough Introduction to the volume, the editors make a bold claim about the drift of 
methodology since the 1970s: ‘While economists remained attached to traditional logical positivist methods and 
the empirical verification of theories, economic methodologists almost universally rejected them’ (p. xvii). There 
is a large grain of truth to this, to the failure of methodologists to have their preaching penetrate the profession 
of economists, many of whom are still in thrall of Milton Friedman. While this may be the common plight of 
philosophers, one can only hope that this volume constitutes an important step in dissolving the divide. 
2.2. Reply (JD) 
Margaret Schabas’ comments on the Methodology and Epistemology section in the Companion are most 
welcome, because she brings a philosopher’s perspectives to chapters written almost entirely by economic 
methodologists. Thus, interestingly, she sees less emphasis on classical epistemological issues and more 
emphasis on characteristically methodological issues in chapters 10, 11 and 12, and indeed sees significant 
attention to epistemological issues in the ontology section of the volume. This might be said to reflect two 
developments in the general field of economic methodology. On the one hand, the field of economic 
methodology in recent years has moved further towards trying to understand the engagement of methodology 
with economics per se, where classical epistemological issues are remote. On the other hand, ontological 
thinking by methodologists is both comparatively more recent in the field of economic methodology and also 
still somewhat removed from more direct engagement with economics, such that classical philosophical issues, 
including epistemological ones, are still foremost for many contributors. This difference may lessen as 
methodologists concerned with ontological issues seem to be increasingly focused on the ontological 
commitments economists make. Schabas’ observation, then, might be broadened to say that methodologists in 
general may in the future come to trade less in classical philosophical issues per se and more involved in eliciting 
the kinds of implicit philosophical commitments to be found in economics. 
Schabas makes many interesting observations but I will restrict my comments to those that follow upon my 
remarks above. One concerns Schabas’ reading of Hands’ chapter, which emphasises the evolution of 
methodologists’ use of SSK in the direction of ESK. Hands argues that SSK almost always makes some use of 
some version of economics and is thus to some degree really an ESK. Such a conclusion could hardly be more 
natural for economic methodologists for whom scientists’ behaviour – the object of SSK and ESK work – 
invariably has an economic dimension, albeit not necessarily understood in neoclassical terms. What thus seems 
interesting here, then, and consistent with the suggestion above that methodologists have become more 
engaged with economics, is what an ESK of economics would look like. Are neoclassical economists to be 
understood in terms of their own neoclassical models? In terms of other types of models? Intriguing reflexivity 
problems abound in these questions. And they might be taken to be paradigmatic of larger issues involved in 
understanding the complex relationship between economic methodology and economics. 
Schabas also offers a number of interesting and valuable observations regarding the status of models in 
economics, as interpreted by economic methodologists. First, she asks for greater elucidation of the view that 
models are like material objects, as explained by Boumans following Morgan and Morrison. Modelling, of 
course, is arguably the dominant practice of contemporary economics, though perhaps less clearly so in earlier 
economics. What does saying models are like material objects imply? The claim is certainly an ontological one. 
But if earlier economists are less modellers than theorisers, what was the ontological status of theory? Similar 
issues arise in connection with the Kesting-Vilks chapter that equates models with formalism. More generally, 
then, how is the ontological status of the practices and tools economists employ related to their own ontological 
status? These questions also direct us to look beyond the framework of the Companion in terms of its separation 
between the second and third parts. 
All this brings us conveniently to the one chapter in part two contributed by a philosopher, Kincaid’s discussion 
of methodological individualism. Methodological individualism is both an organising strategy for neoclassical 
economists and also an ontological commitment. Kincaid shows us how complicated the former becomes when 
seen in terms of the latter. If game theory posits multiple equilibria and subpersonal strategies, what basis is 
there for taking individuals as ontologically unified entities? But personal identity questions such as this are 
hardly on the minds of contemporary methodological individualists. In this regard, the apparent move of 
economic methodology towards greater engagement with economics and also with ontology has much to offer. 
Schabas also offers a number of general comments. She correctly notes that the methodology of economics is a 
burgeoning field, and tells us throughout her comment that there are many unexplored avenues ahead. Many of 
these new possible directions could not have been anticipated a number of years ago. Backhouse, for example, 
goes beyond the standard view of Lakatos, Popper and Kuhn by providing a more historical and less 
prescriptivist reading of Lakatos. Barker shows feminist economic methodology to be concerned with its own 
engagements, specifically with questions of oppressions of race, class, and nation. What, then, is economic 
methodology today? I have suggested two recent directions and types of emphasis, and close with a comment 
on one, the greater engagement with the practices of economics, in an attempt to give something of an answer 
to this last question. 
If indeed economic methodologists are more concerned with the state of economics than previously, we need to 
ask what the state of economics is if we are to say something about what the state of economic methodology is. 
Economics post-1980, however, seems increasingly diffuse and multi-directional. Whereas neoclassical 
economics was dominant in the postwar period through the economics imperialism forays of the 1970s, in 
recent decades experimentalism, behaviouralism, evolutionary economics and complexity theory, to name the 
most prominent new approaches, have changed the landscape of economics. Thus economic methodology in its 
engagement with economics has a changing object of investigation. But lest we think this makes matters more 
difficult for methodologists, we might note that the overall prospects for economic methodology seem to be 
enhanced by the fragmentation of mainstream economics. That is, as new approaches in economics crowd one 
another for attention, their proponents find themselves making recourse to methodological arguments to justify 
their respective orientations. These may not come in the form of traditional methodological discourse but 
methodological they nonetheless are. 
So the identity of economic methodology seems unavoidably a working project. Schabas must be thanked for 
asking her probing questions to this end and for bringing the question of future directions to the attention of all. 
3. Social Ontology and the Ontology of Economics 
3.1. Comment (FG) 
Ontology is one of today’s buzzwords. It is back in fashion in analytical philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, and 
major ‘ontological’ projects and research centres get funding around the world (cf. e.g. the Buffalo Centre for 
Ontological Research, the Laboratory for Ontology in Turin, the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical 
Information Science in Saarland). In the philosophy of science ontology has arguably always been a key area of 
research, under the guise of ‘The foundations of …’ (physics, biology, chemistry etc.). Economics however is an 
exception. Because of economics’ hybrid status, philosophers’ interest in its foundations has traditionally 
focused on normative issues – typically on the theory of rationality that lies at the core of the neoclassical 
paradigm. What is relatively new, then,6 is the current growth of interest for the metaphysics of economics as 
a descriptive scientific discipline; see e.g. Mäki (2001). 
Given economic ontology’s relatively recent history, this is inevitably the most present-centred and forward-
looking part of the Companion. And consequently there is also more potential for disagreement over the choice 
of topics. Having said that, in my view the editors have done a good job in mapping the current state of research 
in this area. There are some classics, like probability and money; some indisputably ‘hot’ topics like collective 
intentionality. I would have liked to see a chapter on causation and related notions (tendencies, powers, 
counterfactuals) – but you cannot have it all, I guess. 
The allocation of space seems to reflect the levels of activity in the various areas during the last decade or so. 
The most vocal supporters of an ‘ontological’ turn in the philosophy of economics have been the members of 
the so-called Critical Realist school, whose contributions take up a big slice of Part III of the Companion (three 
contributions out of eight are ‘orthodox’ Critical Realism, I would say, and another three show some traces of 
influence). The opening essay by Tony Lawson is a programmatic statement of the method and role of 
ontological research according to Critical Realism, and provides a useful point of entry for somebody who is not 
acquainted with this body of work. It is also a good starting point for a critical discussion, for in ontology broadly 
conceived (in analytical philosophy, AI and philosophy of science) people are often busier getting on with their 
research than reflecting on what they are doing. 
Let us begin with an obvious concern. Ontology is the theory of what there is, or of the fundamental 
constituents of being. In our culture the ultimate authority concerning the nature and structure of reality is 
science. So, is there room for a non-scientific, or extra-scientific theory of what there is? According to some 
philosophers, including Lawson and the Critical Realists, ontology tackles pre-scientific questions or, using a 
famous Lockean analogy, ‘clears the rubbish’ from the ‘construction site’before the ‘edifice of science’ is built. 
Ontology is the ‘under‐labourer of science’. 
There are at least two versions of this claim, weak and strong. Both move from the historical failure of the 
project of specifying informative universal rules of scientific method. It is generally agreed nowadays that the 
reliability of ampliative (non-deductive) inferences cannot be established a priori. Scientific inferences from data 
to hypotheses are contingent, and success is dependent on the context, or the background conditions, that 
support the inferences themselves. An obvious implication is that scientific inferential methods must be chosen 
with an eye to the context of their application. They must be ‘right’ for their subject, appropriate for the ‘stuff’ 
one is investigating, and in general for the conditions in which the investigation takes place. 
According to the weak version, ontology highlights potential mismatches between the subject matter of 
scientific investigation (the ontology of …) and the method chosen to investigate it (the methodology of …). 
Under this reading the role of ontology is merely one of issuing warnings, or pointing to possibilities: ‘Look’, the 
ontologist says, ‘if the world is like this, your methods are not going to work; for them to work, the world has to 
be like that’. The weak version does not attempt to describe how the world is; it merely issues conditional claims 
of the ‘if … then …’ kind. 
Despite its modesty, the weak version faces some serious obstacles. To begin with, scientific theories and 
scientific methods are usually ontologically opaque. Their ontological commitments, in other words, can rarely 
be read off unequivocally from their axioms, principles, or methodological rules. Take the theory of probability 
and its various interpretations reviewed by Charles McCann in chapter 22 of the Companion. There is arguably 
no single correct ontology of probability but a set of possible interpretations, each one with its own problems 
and limitations, each one more or less adequate depending on the use one intends to put the notion of 
probability. This problem is magnified whenever a literal reading of a given theory/method is uncharitable or 
blatantly implausible. Any ontological exercise then is likely to involve a certain amount of reconstruction; 
see Carrara and Varzi (2001). 
Reconstruction means potential disagreement. So, unsurprisingly, Lawson’s own interpretation of the 
ontological commitments of the deductivist/formalist method widely used in neoclassical economics has met 
quite a lot of scepticism, for other philosophers and economists see different ontological commitments behind 
the neoclassical paradigm. But Lawson has in mind an even more ambitious task for ontological analysis. In the 
strong version of the ‘under-labourer’ view, the ontologist actually puts forward some unconditional claims 
about the way the world is. The structure of the argument is the following: ‘(1) If the world is like this, your 
methods are not going to work; (2) For them to work, the world has to be like that; (3) But the world is like this; 
therefore (4) your methods cannot work’. The ambitious step is of course (3): despite Lawson’s claims to the 
contrary, such a step places ontological research on the same level as science. Not perhaps in direct competition 
with science, because the ontologist is concerned with very general claims such as ‘the social world is open and 
structured at different levels’, ‘individual beings are influenced by and simultaneously influence social 
structures’, and so on; Lawson is right to say that claims like these are often presupposed rather than justified by 
scientific research. But still, they are descriptive empirical claims about the way the world is. 
According to Lawson there is an independent, non-scientific way of validating ontological claims, by means 
of transcendental reasoning. A transcendental argument in the critical realist sense is heavily de-Kanted: it does 
not aim at establishing the necessity of the conclusion, it is fallible, and always revisable. Lawson’s argument 
moves from ‘conceptions of generalised social practices’ (‘agency’ is a favourite of Lawson’s) and concludes by 
way of abductive inference to an ontological claim (e.g.‘social structures (norms, rules) exist’). I will not 
comment on the details of Lawson’s transcendental argument for social structures, I have done it elsewhere 
(Guala, 2005). I will just note that its distinctive character cannot lie in the inferential method, for scientists do 
abductions all the time; hence, only its premises can differentiate it from ordinary scientific reasoning. These 
must contain the framework of reference for the ontological investigation. The premises of the transcendental 
argument are ‘conceptions of generalised human practices’ or, more prosaically, ‘folk’ social science. Below the 
jargon, the transcendental argument looks a lot like a search for the most likely explanation of some ‘evident’ 
features of social reality (we seem to make free choices, we are constrained by social norms), informed by our 
commonsensical understanding of the world. 
But is it wise to take commonsense as our point of departure? Psychologists teach us that our commonsensical 
intuitions about social reality are as unreliable as our folk physics. We are not so good at interpreting our own 
and others’ motives, we tend to misread even fairly simple causal relations, and in general we are affected by a 
wide range of systematic biases. Consider agency, for example: it is well known that we tend to exaggerate the 
extent to which other people are responsible for their choices, and conversely we underestimate the power of 
external constraints. We also tend to ignore the context-specific (often cognitive) factors that trigger norm 
following and so on and so forth. At best, our commonsensical understanding of the social world should be 
backed up by a good deal of empirical evidence. 
This means that there is a continuum, rather than a sharp divide, between ‘ontological’ (but we might as well 
just say ‘theoretical’) speculation and empirical research, and one can hardly proceed without the other. Despite 
dressing up as a metaphysician, the under-labourer of science must inevitably make use of (some) science – a 
lesson that Carnap and Quine taught us a long time ago. By artificially stressing the divide between philosophy 
and science moreover, one runs the risk of never convincing the (inevitably, scientifically minded) audience that 
one’s views are worth taking seriously. If there is a continuum, the battle against dubious science (the 
neoclassical paradigm or whatever) must be fought across the whole front. And in fact there are philosophers 
and social scientists who fight it that way, by intelligently combining empirical investigation with philosophical 
analysis; the work of people like Sugden (1998), Bicchieri (2006), Hacking (2002), or MacKenzie (2004) is what I 
have in mind here. 
These are friendly critiques. I am raising these questions not to dismiss ontological research but because I think 
they are important for the direction that economic ontology will take in the near future. A collection of 
quotations showing that some new institutional economists are against formalism while others are not (chapter 
17) is not, in my view, an interesting contribution to ontology (although it might be an interesting contribution 
to something else). 
Fortunately some chapters of the Companion avoid the insulation from science. Faulkner and Runde (chapter 
21) in their review of the concepts of information, knowledge, beliefs, intentions, provide a nice example of how 
to combine general philosophical analysis with an overview of the relevant evidence provided by psychologists 
and behavioural economists. Similarly Geoffrey Ingham (chapter 23) illustrates how an ontology of money 
(which revealingly he calls a ‘theory of money’) cannot but be deeply informed by existing historical 
investigations in the origins and development of the things that over the centuries have been considered 
‘money’. John Davis (chapter 19) also argues convincingly that some philosophical disagreements concerning the 
intentional foundations of social institutions (‘I-intentionality’ vs. ‘we-intentionality’ foundations, in the current 
philosophical jargon) are not to be solved by means of conceptual analysis. There probably are examples of both 
kinds of institutions in reality, and which one is more common or robust is essentially an empirical matter. 
To sum up: ontology is probably here to stay and this is a welcome development. It is important, however, that 
some key methodological issues are clarified before we proceed. Philosophers of economics must be allowed to 
tackle fundamental questions that are currently ignored by economists. And in fact it is not by chance that some 
important new areas of research have been first explored by philosophers. But we must also be aware that the 
purely speculative approach has some limitations and can only go thus far unless it is complemented by other 
methods. We must also be careful not to be fooled about the status of ontological analysis by trendy words 
(‘metaphysical’, ‘transcendental’, ‘essential’) which just hide philosophers’ unwillingness to get their hands dirty 
with the business of studying reality as it is – as opposed as how it should be according to their Oxbridge 
intuitions. Many social scientists outside economics have been busy studying rules, norms, institutions, beliefs, 
and the other entities that are at the core of ontological debate. In the end the boundaries between economic 
ontology, sociology, economic psychology, economic and social history, and so forth should turn out to be more 
arbitrary than we currently think. 
3.2. Reply (JR) 
I am very grateful to Francesco Guala for his comments. It is natural that he should concentrate on Tony 
Lawson’s chapter in the volume, as this is devoted to developing a general position on the nature and purpose 
of ontological research in economics. As Guala observes, Lawson advances a version of the Lockean conception 
of the philosopher as under-labourer for science. Guala makes an interesting distinction between strong and 
weak versions of the under-labourer idea. The weak version looks for mismatches between method and subject 
matter but tends to deal in possibilities rather than attempting to describe the world as it is. The strong version, 
in contrast, does attempt to make claims about how the world is. 
Guala sees difficulties with both interpretations. The weak version faces the problem that the methods and 
models used by economists are ‘ontologically opaque’, that is, that economists’ ontological commitments 
cannot be read directly off the tools they use. The strong version faces the additional problems that it strays into 
doing science and thereby runs into conflict with the under-labourer idea, and, at least as represented in 
Lawson’s writings, is too reliant on folk psychology. 
The problem of ontological opacity is a real one. It is indeed not possible to read economists’ ontological 
commitments off their models in any direct and simple way. Economists who routinely assume one-agent 
economies, perfect competition, common knowledge of rationality and the like in their modelling work, would 
be surprised if such assumptions were interpreted as a sign of their being committed to the existence of these 
phenomena as real features of the world. The same goes for the deeper, more abstract kind of assumptions 
typically not mentioned when models are formulated. For example, I suspect that most economists would baulk 
at the atomistic or deterministic structure of their models being interpreted as their denying that the social 
world is characterised by internal as well as external relations or that it evolves in a non-deterministic way. The 
conventional view is simply that both sorts of assumptions, be they explicit or the more hidden, unstated kind, 
are idealisations that represent a price worth paying for what they facilitate in any modelling endeavour. 
One response to all this is to argue that economists’ methods and models reflect particular ontological 
presuppositions irrespective of the beliefs of those who create and use them. But here too different authors 
tend to emphasise different things. For Lawson the distinguishing feature of mainstream economics is its 
emphasis on formal modelling, which he sees as reflecting a view of science that presupposes the existence of 
sharp regularities between events (‘closed systems’ in his terminology, which seem to be notable for their 
absence in the social realm). This position is of course merely one instance of a broad position that has been 
stated many times before and is, to this extent, perhaps less of an outlier than Guala’s comment may suggest. 
But there are indeed always differences over details and it is certainly true that different authors often point to 
different things when characterising mainstream economics, such as a commitment to individualism, rationality, 
equilibrium and so on. As Guala observes, any ontological exercise is inevitably going to involve some degree of 
reconstruction. 
The diversity of views on the ontological presuppositions of the methods employed in economics should 
therefore not be surprising, and indeed much of the literature is devoted to debating the differences. All this 
should not be seen as a problem, as such debates can be very useful in generating critical perspectives, teasing 
out hidden presuppositions and so on, that lead to a better understanding of the subject. But the ontology of 
economics is about more than the properties and presuppositions of economic models. It is also increasingly 
taking the form of descriptive ontology that attempts to investigate, specify and conceptualise directly, different 
aspects of the socio-economic world, such as capabilities (Martins, forthcoming), money (Ingham, 2004) and 
institutions (Searle, 2005) to name just three. A characteristic feature of this work is that it proceeds to build 
theories in terms of propositions and statements that, while necessarily partial, are intended to be descriptively 
accurate of the phenomena concerned. That is to say, it is work that privileges abstraction over the kind of 
idealisation that characterises standard economic analysis (Runde, 1996), much of which is presented in terms 
of ideal and limit-types that everyone knows to be descriptively false of the world. 
It may well be that the ontology of economics will run into conflict with the under-labourer idea, especially in 
pursuing the latter path. Whether it actually does so or not of course depends in part on where science is seen 
to begin and end. For Lawson science begins where researchers begin to address specific concrete questions and 
attempt to retroduce causes, for Guala where researchers start making empirical claims. My own view is that 
attempts to establish a hard and fast line demarcating the ontology of economics from economics proper are 
unlikely to succeed and, more importantly, that such attempts are likely to be counterproductive. There was a 
time when economists could write extensively on the nature of economic phenomena without being perceived 
as doing anything other than contributing to economics. This is no longer the case and economics is the poorer 
as a result. The kind of descriptive ontology mentioned above offers a glint of hope in this regard and the last 
thing it needs at this stage is to be parcelled off in a way that renders it yet another specialist activity that is 
tangential to mainstream economic research. 
One last point. Guala appears to suggest that the premises of the kind of transcendental arguments favoured by 
proponents of critical realism are necessarily restricted to ‘conceptions of generalised human practices’ or ‘folk 
science’ derived from our commonsensical understanding of the world. This seems to me a misunderstanding. In 
the first place, while conceptions of generalised human practices will often be the place to start in socio-
economic analysis, not least in studies of what economists themselves do, this is not a matter of necessity. As 
Lawson himself puts it in his chapter in the Companion, his strategy has been to explain various generalised 
‘features of experience including human actions, and so to uncover generalised insights regarding the structure 
or nature of reality’ (p. 328, emphasis added). Exactly where the analysis starts depends on the question being 
raised and may not include human practices at all, such as the symptoms of mad cow’s disease (a favourite 
example of Lawson’s), particular crops failing and others not, and so on. Second, there is nothing in Lawson that 
restricts the objects of analysis to items of folk psychology. They might just as well be features of regularity that 
have to be teased out with close empirical, and perhaps even statistical and/or experimental, work. Guala is 
surely right to say that at best, ‘our commonsense understanding of the social world should be backed up by a 
good deal of empirical evidence’. But it would be wrong to suggest that Lawson would have it any other way. 
4. Concluding Note 
Economics and philosophy, as a domain of investigation, constitutes a set of inquiries into the nature and status 
of economics that come from both inside and outside the discipline. In some cases these inquiries stem from 
philosophical problems that arise within economics itself. In other cases the impetus comes from outside 
economics, such as where philosophers aim to test the boundaries and assess the principal results of the 
disciplines they examine. Either way, the subject offers significant scope for multiple dialogues and invariably 
reflects a broad range of perspectives. One of the primary aims of the Companion was to encourage this kind of 
multi-perspectival discussion by bringing together a diversity of voices on the state of the philosophy of 
economics. The exchanges between the reviewers of this volume and its editors recorded above, with both 
philosophers and economists involved, constitute a further round of the discussion. We look forward to the ones 
to follow. 
Footnotes 
1. On how rational choice politics can neuter the public choice critique of government; see Stigler (1992) and 
more recently Wittman (1995). For a critique of rational choice politics on empirical grounds; see Green and 
Shapiro (1994). 
2. James Buchanan (1982) distinguishes between questions that can be analysed by treating the actor as 
equivalent to a rat (where neoclassical economics is most appropriate) and those that require the actor to be 
viewed as a creative individual (where the subjectivist economics of Shackle (1972) and the Austrians is more 
appropriate). Buchanan is thus able to perform the difficult trick of appearing both a hard-boiled rational choice 
theorist and a social philosopher and political economist. 
3. On the importance of ideology in providing the raw material for economic analysis see Schumpeter (1954). 
Also see the chapters in the Companion by Cardoso (Chapter 1) on natural law and political economy, and 
Leroux (Chapter 8) on ideology. Leroux asks why economists have paid so little attention to ideology, and we 
would suggest that at least part of the answer is a consequence of a commitment to the rationality assumptions 
deployed in mainstream economics that render irrelevant such discussions in so-called scientific economics. 
4. A first attempt can be seen in the collection by Bates et al. (1998). Elster (2000) warns that this approach risks 
running into the problem of twisting the narrative to fit the analytic structure. 
5. See the work of German sociologist Hans Albert (1979). Albert’s intellectual agenda has been pursued in more 
recent years by Vanberg (1994, 2001). 
6. The ‘relatively’ accounts for old die-hard problems like methodological individualism, which span across the 
methodology/ontology divide; see Kincaid’s essay in Part II of the Companion. 
References 
Albert, H. (1979). ‘The economic tradition – economics as a research programme for theoretical social science’, 
in (K. Brunner, ed.), Economics and Social Institutions, pp. 1–27, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing. 
Bates, R.H., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J‐L. and Weingast, B.R. (1998). Analytic Narratives, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boettke, P.J. (1998). ‘James M. Buchanan and the rebirth of political economy’, in (S. Pressman and R. Holt, 
eds.), Against the Grain: Dissent in Economics, pp. 21–39, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Buchanan, J.M. (1969). Cost and Choice, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company. 
Buchanan, J.M. (1982). ‘The domain of subjective economics: between predictive science and moral philosophy’, 
in (I. Kirzner, ed.), Method, Process and Austrian Economics, pp. 7–20, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 
Buchanan, J.M. (1987). ‘Constitutional economics’, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Buchanan, J.M. (1989). ‘Shackle and a lecture in Pittsburgh’, Market Process, vol. 7 (Spring), pp. 2–4. 
Buchanan, J.M. (1990). ‘The domain of constitutional economics’, Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 1(1), pp. 
1–18. 
Buchanan, J.M. (2000). ‘The soul of classical liberalism’, The Independent Review, vol. 1, pp. 111–9. 
Buchanan, J.M. and Vanberg, V.J. (2002). ‘Constitutional implications of radical subjectivism’, The Review of 
Austrian Economics, vol. 15(2/3), pp. 121–9. 
Carrara, M. and Varzi, A.C. (2001). ‘Ontological commitment and reconstructivism’, Erkenntnis, vol. 55, pp. 33–
50. 
Elster, J. (2000). ‘Rational choice history: a case of excessive ambition’, American Political Science Review, vol. 94 
(3), pp. 685–95. 
Green, D. and Shapiro, I. (1994). Pathologies of Rational Choice, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Guala, F. (2005). ‘Talking about structures: the ‘‘transcendental’’ argument’, Revue de Philosophie Economique, 
forthcoming. 
Hacking, I. (2002). Historical Ontology, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hands, D.W. (2001). Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hayek, F.A. (1976). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Ingham, G. (2004). The Nature of Money, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mäki, U. (ed.), (2001). The Economic World View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MacKenzie, D. (2004). ‘The big, bad wolf and the rational market: portfolio insurance, the 1987 crash and the 
performativity of economics’, Economy and Society, vol. 33, pp. 303–34. 
Marciano, A. (2005). ‘Benevolence, sympathy and Hume’s model of government: how different is new political 
economy from classical political economy?’, History of Political Economy, annual supplement, pp. 40–67.  
Martins, N. (forthcoming). ‘Capabilities as causal powers’, Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
Morgan, M.S. and Morrison, M. (eds.) (1999). Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Runde, J. (1996). ‘Abstraction, idealisation and economic theory’, in (P. Arestis, G. Palma, and M. Sawyer, eds.), 
Markets, Unemployment and Economic Theory: Essays in Honour of Geoff Harcourt, (vol. 2), pp. 16–29, 
London: Routledge. 
Ruskin, J. (1862). Unto the Last, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1954). History of Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Searle, J.R. (2005). ‘What is an institution?’, Journal of Institutional Economics, vol. 1, pp. 1–22. 
Sen. A. (1999). ‘Amartya Sen’, in (R. Swedberg, ed.) Economics and Sociology, ch. 14, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Shackle, G.L.S. (1972). Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sidgwick, H. (1885). ‘Economic science and statistics’, the address of the president of the section F of the British 
Association at the 55th meeting, Journal of the Statistical Society of London, vol. 48(4), pp. 595–616. 
Stigler, G. (1992). ‘Law or economics?’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 35(2), pp. 455–68. 
Sugden, R. (1998). ‘The role of inductive reasoning in the evolution of conventions’, Law and Philosophy, vol. 17, 
pp. 377–410. 
Swedberg, R. (1990). Economics and Sociology: On Redefining Their Boundaries, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
Vanberg, V. (1994). Rules and Choice in Economics and Sociology, London: Routlege. 
Vanberg, V. (2001). The Constitution of Markets, London: Routledge. 
Von Mises, L. (1966). Human Action, Chicago: Henry Regnery. 
Wiseman, J. (1991). ‘The black box’, Economic Journal, vol. 101, pp. 149–55. 
Witt, U. (2004). The Evolving Economics, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Wittman, D. (1995). The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
